Entry tags:
History changes
Recently I've been reading a booklet on US Foreign Policies through history - one that was written in 1943, revised in 1945.
It's interesting.
At some point I'm going to do a detailed writeup of... a bunch of things, really, but a highlight to note about this booklet:
1) The author throws some truly amazing shade. It's all about foreign policy, so it largely skims domestic issues, and yet... there is shade in the most arch and neutral way. It's beautiful.
2) More importantly/notably: in the recitation of events, he blandly recounts a number of events in the manner of one reminding the reader of things that are well-known to be true but a non-historian might have forgotten.
The curious thing is that some of them are events that I recall, in my lifetime, people getting very excited about, "So we thought this wasn't true, but it turns out that it is!"
For example, I have clear recollection of a discussion of divers discovering that the wreck of the Lusitania turned out to hold ammunition, and this being a surprise because it was believed that it did not.
And yet, in this booklet written in the 40s, the author casually notes that the Lusitania was carrying munitions, and discusses the issue of the sinking of the Lusitania in that context.
It also brought home to me in ways I had never consciously considered that, as a matter of policy and practice, the US was militarily weak throughout its history until the Second World War.
I should be clear that it was written by an American when I get to this part.
He reviews how the US's survival from the Revolutionary War onward was dependent on others; on the aid of France in the Revolutionary War itself, and onwards. How the Monroe Doctrine, at the outset, was sustained because the US was sheltered behind the "stout wooden walls" of the British fleet.
He notes that the US's entry into the World Wars was delayed, in part, by the great appeal of profiting by selling to both sides, and reviews in detail how badly the US mishandled various things in the period between the wars.
Without quite using the word, that I recall, he acknowledges that the US was profoundly hypocritical in its approach to some matters dealing with the European Powers.
It's strange, because a measured critique of American policy, by an American, that acknowledges that the US's behaviour has been flawed, and that dispassionately identifies the ways in which assorted events were driven by national self-interest rather than some kind of noble purpose is kind of novel.
Apparently it used to be allowed.
It's interesting.
At some point I'm going to do a detailed writeup of... a bunch of things, really, but a highlight to note about this booklet:
1) The author throws some truly amazing shade. It's all about foreign policy, so it largely skims domestic issues, and yet... there is shade in the most arch and neutral way. It's beautiful.
2) More importantly/notably: in the recitation of events, he blandly recounts a number of events in the manner of one reminding the reader of things that are well-known to be true but a non-historian might have forgotten.
The curious thing is that some of them are events that I recall, in my lifetime, people getting very excited about, "So we thought this wasn't true, but it turns out that it is!"
For example, I have clear recollection of a discussion of divers discovering that the wreck of the Lusitania turned out to hold ammunition, and this being a surprise because it was believed that it did not.
And yet, in this booklet written in the 40s, the author casually notes that the Lusitania was carrying munitions, and discusses the issue of the sinking of the Lusitania in that context.
It also brought home to me in ways I had never consciously considered that, as a matter of policy and practice, the US was militarily weak throughout its history until the Second World War.
I should be clear that it was written by an American when I get to this part.
He reviews how the US's survival from the Revolutionary War onward was dependent on others; on the aid of France in the Revolutionary War itself, and onwards. How the Monroe Doctrine, at the outset, was sustained because the US was sheltered behind the "stout wooden walls" of the British fleet.
He notes that the US's entry into the World Wars was delayed, in part, by the great appeal of profiting by selling to both sides, and reviews in detail how badly the US mishandled various things in the period between the wars.
Without quite using the word, that I recall, he acknowledges that the US was profoundly hypocritical in its approach to some matters dealing with the European Powers.
It's strange, because a measured critique of American policy, by an American, that acknowledges that the US's behaviour has been flawed, and that dispassionately identifies the ways in which assorted events were driven by national self-interest rather than some kind of noble purpose is kind of novel.
Apparently it used to be allowed.